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I. Introduction 
In the relevant time period of this update, one Colorado Supreme Court 
case and two Colorado Court of Appeals decisions were issued that 
significantly impacted the oil and gas industry.  In Kinder Morgan CO2 Co. 
v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed 
a retroactive tax assessment imposed by a county assessor based on a 
determination that oil and gas production had been underreported.1  
Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm., a controversial decision 
by the Colorado Court of Appeals now being further appealed, addressed 
the statutory duties and responsibilities of the Colorado Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission (“Commission”).2 Finally, in Grant Bros. 
Ranch, LLC v. Antero Res. Piceance Corp., the Colorado Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed the primary jurisdiction of the Commission over certain issues 
defined by statute affecting non-consenting mineral owners.3  Noteworthy 
district court decisions and ballot measures are discussed as well.   
This update also highlights four significant bills which, if enacted, would 
have materially affected the oil and gas industry; however, none of these 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 2017 CO 72, 396 P.3d 657 (Colo. 2017).     
 2. 2017 COA 37, 2017 WL 1089556 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 3. 2016 CO 178, 2016 WL 7009138 (Colo. App. Dec. 1, 2016). 
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bills were passed.  Finally, recent regulatory and executive actions 
responding to a recent incident involving oil and gas flowlines in a 
Colorado municipality are discussed.   
II. Case Law 
A. Retroactive Oil and Gas Assessments 
In Kinder Morgan CO2 Co. v. Montezuma Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, the 
Colorado Supreme Court considered whether the statutory scheme set forth 
in Colorado Revised Code (“C.R.S.”) § 39-5-125(1) authorizes “retroactive 
taxation where an operator underreports the selling price at the wellhead of 
the oil and gas it produces.”4 Additionally, the court considered whether 
certain parties were “related” for purposes of determining the extent to 
which transportation deductions may be used to calculate the value of oil 
and gas at the wellhead, being the value upon which assessments are 
levied.5   
Kinder Morgan CO2 Company, L.P. (“Kinder Morgan”) operated 
leaseholds covering oil and gas interests in Montezuma County, Colorado.6  
In 2009, the county assessor conducted an audit and retroactively assessed 
over two million dollars ($2,000,000.00) in property taxes after determining 
that Kinder Morgan had underreported the value of the gas produced from 
those leaseholds.7  Kinder Morgan paid the taxes under protest and sought 
reimbursement, but the Montezuma County Board of Petitioners denied 
their petitions.8  Thereafter, Kinder Morgan appealed to the Colorado Board 
of Assessment Appeals and the Colorado Court of Appeals, both of which 
affirmed the Board’s decision.9  The Colorado Supreme Court granted 
Kinder Morgan’s petition for a writ of certiorari, but ultimately affirmed the 
Board’s decision.10 
                                                                                                                 
 4. 2017 CO 72, ¶ 1, 396 P.3d at 659. 
 5. See id. ¶¶ 7-8, 396 P.3d at 660-61 (“If [an] operator enters into a bona fide, arm’s-
length transaction with an unrelated party to perform [gathering, processing and 
transportation] services, then the operator may deduct the full amount paid for these services 
from its final, downstream sales price” to calculate the wellhead selling price of produced oil 
and gas. Id. ¶ 9. However, “[i]f the operator instead enters into a transaction with a related 
party . . . then it may deduct only a portion of the amount paid” for such services. Id.). 
 6. Id. ¶ 1, 396 P.3d at 659. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. ¶ 17, 396 P.3d at 663.  
 9. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.  
 10. Id. ¶ 20. 
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Kinder Morgan first argued that, although the aforementioned statute 
authorizes retroactive assessments for property that had been “omitted from 
the assessment roll,” it does not authorize retroactive assessments when an 
operator correctly reports the volume of oil and gas sold but underreports 
the selling price at the wellhead of that oil and gas.11  The court rejected the 
argument, identifying two statutes that vest county assessors with the 
authority to retroactively assess taxes on “omitted” property.12    
C.R.S. § 39-5-125 provides that:  
[W]henever it is discovered that any taxable property has been 
omitted from the assessment roll of any year or series of years, 
the assessor shall immediately determine the value of such 
omitted property and shall list the same on the assessment roll of 
the year in which the discovery was made . . . .13   
C.R.S. § 39-5-125(1) states: 
[If] the treasurer discovers that any taxable property then located 
in the treasurer’s county has been omitted from the tax list and 
warrant for the current year or for any prior year . . . , the 
treasurer shall forthwith list and value such property for 
assessment in the same manner as the assessor might have 
done.14   
Thus, the question becomes whether underreporting the value of produced 
oil and gas constitutes “omitted property” under the foregoing statutes.15 
The court focused on two aspects of the statutory scheme: “[(1)] the 
legislature’s amendments to the statutory scheme and the self-reporting 
procedure for valuation of oil and [(2)] gas leaseholds in Colorado.”16  The 
court acknowledged that the 1990 approval of House Bill 90-1018 
demonstrated strong evidence in support of the underreported oil and gas 
value receiving treatment as “omitted property.”17  That bill amended the 
statutory language to identify the underreporting of the selling price of oil 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. ¶ 35, 396 P.3d at 666. 
 12. See id. ¶¶ 35-37, 396 P.3d at 666-67. 
 13. Id. ¶ 25, 396 P.3d at 664 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-125 (2016)) (emphasis 
added and quotations omitted). 
 14. Kinder Morgan, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 25. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-5-125(1) 
(2016)) (emphasis added and quotations omitted). 
 15. Id. ¶ 26.  
 16. Id.    
 17. Id.  ¶ 27, 396 P.3d at 664-65.  
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and gas as an omission from the assessment roll in certain circumstances.18  
First, the bill amended the language to provide that “revenues received as 
taxes paid on oil and gas leaseholds and lands that had been previously 
omitted from the assessment roll due to underreporting of selling price or 
the quantity of oil or gas sold therefrom” would not count towards a taxing 
entity’s limit.19  Second, the bill provided that the general rule regarding 
timing for apportioning, crediting, and distrubitng taxes would nto apply to 
taxes collected for any prior tax year on oil and gas leaseholds and lands 
previously “omitted from the assessment roll due to underreporting the 
selling price or the quantity . . . .”20 Because the legislature provided 
“special procedures for handling taxes that had been retroactively assessed 
based on underreported selling price or volume, the legislature necessarily 
intended for such taxes to be retroactively assessed.”21   
With respect to the second aspect, the court pointed out that the assessor 
relied on information provided by the taxpayer to initially assess the value 
of leasehold property.22  Necessarily, “the assessor must be able to issue 
corrective assessments to avoid under-taxation caused by an operator’s 
errors in reporting.”23  Additionally, the court clarified that the audit 
procedures afforded to assessors in reviewing oil and gas leasehold taxation 
would be incomplete if the assessors lacked authority to correct issues 
uncovered while conducting these audits.24 This, in essence, would violate 
the rules of equity.25  The court concluded that the statutory scheme 
supported the retroactive assessment of property taxes on underreported 
selling prices or volumes of oil and gas.26 
The court also rejected Kinder Morgan’s second argument—that the 
party with whom it contracted for gathering, processing, and transportation 
services was not a “related party” and therefore entitled to deduct the full 
                                                                                                                 
 18. See id.  
 19. Id. (quoting Ch. 277, sec. 39, § 29-1-301(a), 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1687) 
(empahsis added and internal quotations omitted).  
 20. Kinder Morgan, 2017 CO 72, ¶ 27, 396 P.3d at 665 (quoting Ch. 277, sec. 40, § 39-
10-107(1), 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1687).  
 21. Id. ¶ 28. 
 22. Id. ¶ 31 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 396 P.3d at 666. 
 25. See id. ¶ 39, 396 P.3d at 667 (holding that “[a] taxpayer would never be taxed on the 
full value of its leasehold property . . . and contravene the constitutional principle that a 
taxpayer’s property tax liability shall be determined based on the ‘actual value’ of the 
taxable property.”). 
 26. Id. ¶ 34, 396 P.3d at 666. 
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amount paid for such services.27  The court explained that Kinder Morgan 
owned a 50% interest in the pipeline partnership that performed these 
services.28  Because the Assessor’s Reference Library defined “related 
parties” to include “individuals who are connected by . . . partnerships,”29 
Kinder Morgan was not entitled to deduct the entire amount paid for 
services enabling sale in a downstream market.30  Instead, it was entitled to 
deduct only a portion of the charges, and therefore the county’s retroactive 
assessment of the difference was proper.31  
B. Commission’s Authority to Regulate Oil and Gas Development 
1. Overview of Martinez v. Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission 
In Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm., the court 
considered the scope of authority granted to the Commission under the Oil 
and Gas Conservation Act (“Act”) to regulate oil and gas production.32  
Martinez and others (collectively, the “Petitioners”) filed a petition for 
rulemaking with the Commission asking it the Commission to adopt the 
following rules: 
[N]ot issue any permits for the drilling of a well for oil and gas 
unless the best available science demonstrates, and an 
independent third party organization confirms, that drilling can 
occur in a manner that does not cumulatively, with other actions, 
impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife, and land 
resources, does not adversely impact human health and does not 
contribute to climate change.33 
The Commission denied the petition for three reasons.  First, it found 
that the action contemplated in the proposed rule was beyond the scope of 
authority granted to it by the Colorado General Assembly (“General 
Assembly”) in the Act.34  Second, it found that the third-party review 
requested by the Petitioners contradicted its “nondelegable duty to 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. ¶¶ 44-45, 396 P.3d at 668. 
 28. Id. ¶ 44.  
 29. Id. ¶ 45. 
 30. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.  
 31. Id. 
 32. 2017 COA 37, 2017 WL 1089556 (Colo. App. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 33. Id. ¶ 5, 2017 WL 1089556, at *2. 
 34. Id. ¶ 7. 
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promulgate rules” and the Act itself.35  Third, it concluded the Petitioners’ 
proposed rule was based on the public trust doctrine, which does not exist 
in Colorado.36  The Commission also commented that the Colorado 
Department of Health and the Environment had been assigned many of the 
duties by the legislature.37 
Petitioners appealed the Commission’s decision to the district court, 
which affirmed the Commission’s decision.38  The district court found that 
the Act’s language was “clear and unambiguous and requires a balance 
between the development of oil and gas resources and protecting public 
health, safety and welfare.”39  Petitioners appealed the district court’s 
decision, alleging that it had erred in interpreting the Act.40  In a two-to-one 
decision, the court of appeals reversed, agreeing with Petitioners that the 
language of the Act “unambiguously supports a conclusion different from 
that reached by Commission and the district court”41 and remanded the case 
“for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”42 
In its review, the court of appeals first noted that the Commission has 
broad authority under the Act “to ‘make and enforce rules, regulations, and 
orders’ and ‘to do whatever may be reasonably necessary’ to carry out the 
provisions of the Act.”43  The Commission also has the power “to regulate 
‘the drilling, producing, and plugging of wells and all other operations for 
the production of oil and gas.’”44  The clear and unambiguous language 
referenced by the district court is found in C.R.S. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I), 
where “the General Assembly declares that it is in the public interest to: 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. The public trust doctrine holds that certain natural resources are preserved, and 
must be protected by the government, for public use. 
 37. Id. ¶ 8. 
 38. Id. ¶ 9. 
 39. Id. ¶ 10 (applying the two-part test of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  
 40. Martinez, 2017 COA 37, ¶ 11, 2017 WL 1089556, at *3.  
 41. Id. ¶ 19, 2017 WL 1089556, at *4.  
 42. See id. ¶ 36, 2017 WL 1089556, at *8.  Notably, the language quoted above was 
used as part of the court’s rationale in determining the proper meaning of the Commission’s 
duty to regulate oil and gas “in a manner consistent with” public health and safety.  See id. 
¶¶ 29-31, 2017 WL 1089556, at *6-*7. 
 43. Id.  ¶ 15, 2017 WL 1089556, at *3 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-105(1) 
(2016)). 
 44. Martinez, 2017 COA 37, ¶ 15 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(a) 
(2016)). 
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Foster the responsible, balanced development, production, and 
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of 
Colorado in a manner consistent with protection of public health, 
safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and 
wildlife resources.”45 
The crux of the Petitioners’ appeal was the italicized language above.  
The Commission interpreted this text “as requiring a balance between oil 
and gas production and public health, safety, and welfare.”46 This would 
have required the Commission to “to readjust the balance crafted by the 
General Assembly under the Act,” thereby causing it exceed its rulemaking 
authority.47  The Petitioners disagreed, contending that the Commission’s 
reading disregarded the “in a manner consistent with” language, and argued 
the reference to the term “balanced” was solely in relation to the 
development, production and utilization of natural resources, i.e. that those 
things should be authorized in a balanced manner.48  Under Petitioners’ 
interpretation, public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the 
environment and wildlife resources, were considerations that must be taken 
into account when authorizing oil and gas development, but were not 
interests that such development should be balanced with or against.49 
The majority ultimately agreed with Petitioners’ reading of the Act, 
reiterating that the term “‘balanced’ is an adjective that relates to and 
modifies the nouns ‘development, production, and utilization’” that does 
not affect the remaining words of the above-quoted statute.50  Additionally, 
the majority opined that the phrase “‘in a manner consistent with’ does not 
indicate a balancing test but rather a condition that must be fulfilled.”51  
The majority went further, stating such phrase actually “denotes more than 
a mere balancing.”52 Rather, it is synonymous with the phrase “subject to” 
within the meaning of the Act, which itself indicates a “balanced, 
nonwasteful development . . . in the public interest when . . .  development 
is completed subject to the [public welfare and environmental protection].53 
It found that ascribing such understanding to the term “balanced” and the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(a)(I) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 46. Maritnez, 2017 COA 37, ¶ 17, 2017 WL 1089556, at *4. 
 47. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 48. Id. ¶ 18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
 51. Id. ¶ 21, 2017 WL 1098556, at *5. 
 52. Id. ¶ 23. 
 53. Id. ¶¶  22-23. 
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phrase “in a manner consistent with” gives every word of the statute 
meaning.54   
Moreover, the majority held that the evolution of the statute supported its 
conclusion.  For decades, according to the Court, the Act did not contain the 
“balanced” or “in a manner consistent with” language.55  In 1994, the “in a 
manner consistent with public health, safety and welfare” language was 
added to the statute.56  Thereafter, in 2007, the “balanced” language was 
added to complete the Act as it reads today.57  The court found that the 
plain language of the Act, together with such legislative evolution, evinces 
the General Assembly’s intent to mandate that “the development of oil and 
gas in Colorado be regulated subject to the protection of public health, 
safety, and welfare, including the environment and wildlife resources.”58 
In addition to rejecting the district court’s reading of the Act, the 
majority found that the Commission incorrectly determined that it did not 
have authority to adopt the Petitioner’s proposed rule.59  The court did not 
address the merits of the Petitioners’ proposed rule or whether the 
Commission should adopt the same.60 Instead, the majority held that, in its 
view, the case should be remanded to the district court to be returned to the 
Commission “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”61  
While that language is the standard in the instance of reversal and remand, 
the court did not use that language lightly.  Significantly, it highlighted that 
the intention behind those words “is not to instruct a court on remand to 
take action in a manner ‘balanced with’ the opinion from the appellate 
court, but instead instructs that the court on remand must take action subject 
to the appellate opinion.”62 
Judge Booras wrote a dissenting opinion, taking issue with “the 
majority’s interpretation of the phrase ‘in a manner consistent with’ and its 
reliance on a legislative declaration to find a mandatory duty.”63  Looking 
to the definition of “consistent with” in Webster’s Third New International 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. ¶ 26, 2017 WL 1098556, at *6. 
 55. Id. ¶ 28, 2017 WL 1098556, at *8 (“For decades, the Act read: ‘It is hereby declared 
to be in the public interest to foster, encourage and promote the development, production and 
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the State of Colorado[.]’”). 
 56. Id. ¶ 29 (internal quotations omitted). 
 57. Id. (citation omitted).  
 58. Id. ¶ 30, 2017 WL 1089556, at *7 (citation omitted). 
 59. Id. ¶ 32. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. ¶ 36, 2017 WL 1089556, at *8. 
 62. Id. ¶ 24, 2017 WL 1098556, at *5. 
 63. Id. ¶ 37, 2017 WL 1089556, at *8 (Booras, J., dissenting). 
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Dictionary, Judge Booras noted that said phrase means “‘to be consistent, 
harmonious, or in accordance’”; likewise, said dictionary defines 
“consistently” as “‘compatibly,’ ‘congruously,’ ‘in harmony with,’ and ‘in a 
persistent or even manner.’”64  Additionally, Judge Booras stressed that a 
“legislative declaration is used only to interpret a statute that is ambiguous; 
it cannot override the language of a statute.”65  Finally, Judge Booras found 
that the Commission acted appropriately in denying the proposed 
rulemaking because the proposed rule itself “would have required the 
Commission to view public health and environmental considerations as 
being determinative,” where the Commission’s duty by statute is “to 
regulate oil and gas operations by balancing the relevant considerations.”66  
For these reasons, Judge Booras concluded that the district court’s decision 
should have been affirmed.67 
2. Current Case Status 
On May 18, 2017, two separate Petitions for Writ of Certiorari were filed 
with the Colorado Supreme Court, one by the attorneys for the American 
Petroleum Institute and Colorado Petroleum Association (Intervenors) and 
one for the Commission (Petitioner), seeking review of the court of appeals 
decision in Martinez.  Each petition outlined several reasons why the 
appellate court erred and the supreme court should grant review.  The 
petition submitted by the Commission phrased the key issue as follows:  
“When the Commission engages in rulemaking, is it permitted to disregard 
the Act’s policy of fostering oil and gas development in Colorado?”68 
Both petitions identify the appellate court’s ruling as not only a novel 
interpretation of the Act, but a rejection of the Commission’s longstanding 
approach to regulating oil and gas activities.69  Specifically, the court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. ¶ 40. 
 65. Id. ¶ 41, 2017 WL 1089556, at *9 (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. ¶ 44. 
 67. Id. ¶ 47, 2017 WL 1089556, at *9. 
 68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm’n v. 
Martinez, (No. 2017SC297) (Commission Petition) (petition for cert. filed May 18, 2017). 
 69. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 9. For example, the 
Commission’s petition states that “[s]ince at least 1994, [it] has interpreted the Act to require 
a balancing of each of the potentially competing public policies that the Act codifies.”  Id. at 
6; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Colorado Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm’n v. 
Martinez (No. 17 SC 297) (Intervener Petition) (petition for cert. filed May 18, 2017) (“The 
Court of Appeals Ruling, if not corrected, will radically change the COGCC’s 
implementation of oil and gas law, and will have a drastic impact on the Colorado 
economy.”). 
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interpretation of the act is categorized as “elevating the importance of some 
of the Act’s policies at the expense of others and making ‘the development 
of oil and gas in Colorado . . . subject to the Act’s other objectives.”70  The 
petitions further assert that such interpretation is in conflict with other 
Colorado precedent, both at the supreme court level and also other divisions 
of the court of appeals.71  Based on this, the petitions argue that the state of 
oil and gas law in Colorado has been rendered uncertain, and the supreme 
court’s review is “necessary to ensure that the Commission, as well as the 
public and regulated parties, understands what the Act means and how it 
should be interpreted.”72  The Commission’s petition also notes that the 
implications of the court’s decision reach much farther than the oil and gas 
industry, as “the Commission is not the only agency required to balance 
potentially conflicting policies.”73 
Several briefs have been submitted in response to the aforementioned 
petitions and a decision from the court as to whether it will grant the writs 
is forthcoming. 
C. Remedies Available for Accounting to Non-Consenting Mineral Owners 
In Grant Bros. Ranch, LLC v. Antero Res. Piceance Corp.,74 the 
Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether non-consenting, pooled 
mineral owners must exhaust available administrative remedies provided 
for under the Act before seeking, by court intervention, an accounting of 
proceeds derived from the production of oil and gas.  Grant Brothers owned 
property within a drilling and spacing unit established by the Commission 
which included wells operated by Antero in Garfield County.75 The 
Commission issued an order pooling all of the non-consenting interests in 
the unit pursuant to C.R.S. § 34-60-116(7) and Commission Rule 530 
because Grant Brothers had refused Antero’s reasonable efforts to lease the 
minerals or ask Grant Brothers to participate in their production.76 Antero 
later decided to produce oil and gas from a deeper formation in these lands, 
so it obtained additional spacing and pooling orders after Grant Brothers 
once again refused its reasonable efforts to lease the minerals or invite 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 13 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 71. See id. at 12. 
 72. Id. at 13. 
 73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 75, at 16-17 n.2. 
 74. 2016 COA 178, 2016 WL 7009138 (Colo. App. Dec. 1, 2016).   
 75. Id. ¶ 2, 2016 WL 7009138, at *1.  
 76. Id. ¶ 5. 
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Grant Brothers to participate in their production.77 As a non-consenting 
owner of both units, Grant Brothers was subjected to penalties defined in 
the Act such that it was not entitled to receive its proportionate share of all 
proceeds until Antero had been compensated for Grant Brothers’ share of 
certain costs defined in the Act and a statutory penalty78 As required by the 
Act, the pooling orders also required Antero to furnish Grant Brothers with 
monthly statements containing information about its costs and proceeds 
with respect to both units.79   
Three years after the Commission’s last pooling order was issued, Grant 
Brothers requested permission from Antero to audit its books and records 
regarding the certain wells at issue.80 Antero refused, explaining that it had 
satisfied any outstanding obligations by providing Grant Brothers with the 
required monthly statements.81 Grant Brothers sued Antero and another 
operator within the unit, Ursa Operating Company (“Ursa”) (collectively, 
“Operators”), in district court requesting an equitable accounting and 
alleging the wells had already reached “payout,” entitling Grant Brothers to 
payment from Operators.82 Operators moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that Grant Brothers failed to exhaust its administrative remedies 
available under the Act, and thus, the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the action.83  The district court agreed and granted 
summary judgment, dismissing the action with prejudice.84 
Grant Brothers appealed, contending that it was not required to exhaust 
its administrative remedies.85  Further, Grant Brothers asserted the 
dismissal without prejudice by the district court was inappropriate on the 
basis the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.86  Grant Brothers 
argued that the Act does not contain a clear manifestation of legislative 
intent requiring an involuntary pooled mineral rights owner to exhaust its 
administrative remedies prior to seeking an equitable accounting in district 
court.87 Grant Brothers finally argued these were all issues of law because 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. ¶ 4. 
 78. Id. ¶ 5. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. ¶ 6. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. ¶ 7, 2016 WL 7009138, at *2. 
 83. Id. ¶ 8. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. ¶ 9. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. Grant Brothers argued that the Act’s language and legislative history, which 
included the 1998 amendments to the Act and related testimony from Senator Tilman 
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the Operators’ motion for summary judgment at the district court level was 
effectively a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction more 
properly brought under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).88 This required the court to apply 
a mix standard of review for motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction,89 among other juridical principles shaped by Colorado case 
law.90 
The appellate court unanimously affirmed the district court’s decision, 
concluding that the Act grants the Commission primary jurisdiction to 
address payment disputes with non-consenting owners.91 “[A]bsent a bona 
fide dispute over the interpretation of a contract for payment,” the 
Commission has jurisdiction to determine the date on which payment of 
proceeds is due together with the amount of proceeds and any interest due 
thereon.92 The court cited C.R.S. § 34-60-118.5(5), which states: 
Before hearing the merits of any proceeding regarding payment 
of proceeds pursuant to this section, the [Commission] shall 
determine whether a bona fide dispute exists regarding the 
interpretation of a contract defining the rights and obligations of 
the payer and the payee. If the commission finds that such a 
dispute exists, the commission shall decline jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                                 
Bishop, supported this position. Id.  Operators argued Grant Brothers had failed to preserve 
the right to use Senator Bishop’s testimony to support its contention. See id. ¶ 10. 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 2016 WL 7009138, at *3.  
 89. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Hanson v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 P.3d 256, 257-58 (Colo. 
App. 2006)). 
 90. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 15 (“We review factual findings for clear error, 
and such findings will be upheld unless they have no support in the record. [Hanson v. Colo. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 140 P.3d at 257-58]. However, we review legal conclusions de novo. Id. 
We also review a district court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Anderson v. Vail Corp., 
251 P.3d 1125, 1127-28 (Colo. App. 2010). In construing legislation, we look first to the 
plain language of the statute, reading it as a whole. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 
CO 32, ¶ 11, 325 P.3d 571. Then, if the language is ambiguous, we ‘construe the statute in 
light of the General Assembly’s objective,’ presuming ‘that the legislature intended a 
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect.’” Anderson, 251 P.3d at 1127-28.”). 
 91. See Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶¶ 22-30, 2016 WL 7009138, *4-*6; see also 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(a) (2016) (stating that the Commission has “the authority 
to regulate:  . . . the drilling, producing, and plugging of wells and all other operations for the 
production of oil or gas . . . .”).  
 92. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 17, 2016 WL 7009138, at *3 (quoting COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 34-60-118.5(5)(a), (c) (2016)) (internal quotations omitted).  
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dispute and the parties may seek resolution of the matter in the 
district court.93 
Furthermore, with respect to Operator’s recovery of costs prior to 
payments becoming due to non-consenting owners, the panel examined the 
Act’s direction to the Commission to “determine the proper costs in the 
event of any dispute,”94 once again noting that the Commission’s 
jurisdiction does not extend to contract disputes over the interpretation of a 
payment contract, as the parties in such instance can seek direct relief in 
district court.95 Generally, in Colorado, if “complete, adequate, and speedy” 
administrative exhaustive remedies are available, a party . . . must exhaust 
its remedies before filing suit in district court.”96 
As a result, the court held the district court correctly dismissed the action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.97  The Act’s comprehensive scheme 
vested the Commission with primary jurisdiction to resolve disputes of this 
type with non-consenting parties98 so long as the parties have no contract 
addressing the issue.99 Non-consenting owners must therefore adhere to the 
requirements of the Act by first submitting a written request to the payor 
and then, if the dispute remains unsolved, submitting a Form 38 to the 
Commission to request a hearing.100 Any final order resulting from the 
hearing is subject to judicial review pursuant to Colorado’s Administrative 
                                                                                                                 
 93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-118.5(5) (2016). 
 94. Id.  The Commission also retains jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of 
such costs.  Id. 
 95. See Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶¶ 18-19, 2016 WL 7009138, at *4. The 
Commission also retains jurisdiction to determine “the reasonableness” of such costs. See 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(7)(d) (2017). 
 96. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 20, 2016 WL 7009138, at *4 (citing City & Cty. 
of Denver v. United Air Lines, Inc., 8 P.3d 1206, 1212 (Colo. 2000)).  
 97. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 22.  
 98. Id. ¶ 23. The court stated that “[W]e understand Grant Brothers’ claim as one for 
payment of proceeds arising under sections 34-60-116 and -118.5 of the Act. At issue is: (1) 
whether payout has been reached; (2) if so, the date on which payment proceeds became 
due; and (3) the amount owed (plus interest) to [Grant Brothers] . . . It is undisputed that 
[Grant Brothers] is a nonconsenting owner seeking payment of funds acquired by Operators 
by extracting and selling natural gas from the wells at issue. Consequently, [Grant Brothers] 
qualifies as a ‘payee’ entitled to payment of proceeds from Operators, the ‘payers.’ . . . .  Id. 
The court continued, “[Grant Brothers] entitlement, however, is subject to a condition 
precedent. Where, as here, an operator and a nonconsenting owner have no contract 
addressing the issue, ‘[t]he date on which payment of proceeds is due’ is the date the wells 
reach payout.” Id. ¶ 5, 2016 WL 7009138, at *5. 
 99. See id. ¶ 28.  
 100. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-118.5(2.5) (2016)). 
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Procedure Act, C.R.S. §§ 24-4-101 to -108.101 The court also rejected Grant 
Brothers’ argument that 1998 amendments to the Act evidenced a change in 
the legislature’s intent regarding the primacy of the Commission’s 
jurisdiction over disputes like this one.102 It concluded that allowing parallel 
jurisdiction on these same issues, rather than giving the Commission the 
first opportunity to resolve them, would go against the legislative intent 
revealed by the Act’s declaration.103 Based on these determinations, the 
court of appeals held the district court correctly dismissed the action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.104 
Nonetheless, Grant Brothers did prevail on one point of civil procedure.  
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing Grant Brothers’ 
claim with prejudice. As the “issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised by 
Operators’ motion should have been addressed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),” 
dismissal should have been made without prejudice.105 As a result, any 
effort by the Grant Brothers to seek further relief after administrative 
proceedings before the Commission is not barred.106 
D. Colorado Attorney General Challenges Boulder County Moratorium – 
The People of the State of Colorado, et al. v. The County of Boulder, et al. 
In 2012, Boulder County’s Board of County Commissioners imposed a 
moratorium on all new applications for oil and gas development in the 
county (the “Moratorium”).107 The Moratorium had been extended or re-
imposed eight (8) times, allowing these “short-term” moratoriums to 
effectively act as one, five-year continuous Moratorium.108  On January 26, 
2017, the Colorado Attorney General, Cynthia Coffman, sent a letter to 
three Boulder County Commissioners, demanding Boulder rescind the ban 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 30, 2016 WL 7009138, at *6.  
 102. Id. (“The 1998 amendments did not change the Commission’s primary jurisdiction 
such as the one before us. Rather, they clarified that disputes involving a ‘bona fide dispute 
over the interpretation of a contract for payment’ should be brought in the district court.”). 
See also COLO. REV. STAT. §§34-60-118.5(5) and -118.5(5.5) (2016). 
 103. Grant Brothers, 2016 COA 178, ¶ 32, 2016 WL 7009138, at *7.  
 104. Id. ¶ 33. 
 105. Id. ¶ 35. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, People of the State of 
Colorado ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman & the State of Colorado v. County of Boulder, 
Colorado & the Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, No. 2017CV30151 
(filed Feb. 14, 2017), available at https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/04/complaint-for-declaratory-injunctive-relief-20170214.pdf.  
 108. Id. 
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on oil and gas development by February 10, 2017.109 For support that the 
Moratorium was contrary to Colorado state law, Coffman directed the 
Commissioners’ attention to two Colorado Supreme Court decisions issued 
a year prior, City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n110 and City of 
Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n.111 These two supreme court cases 
made it clear that the state has a superior interest in regulating oil and gas 
development and the local regulations at issue in those cases were impeding 
the state’s effectuation of such interest; therefore, the local governments’ 
attempts at regulation in that area were unlawful.112 As the Moratorium had 
extended longer than the five-year moratorium the Colorado Supreme Court 
struck down in City of Fort Collins, Attorney General Coffman firmly 
asserted the Moratorium was unlawful.113 
In response to Attorney General Coffman’s letter, the Board of County 
Commissioners sent a response letter indicating their position that the 
Moratorium was not unlawful.114 According to Boulder County Attorney’s 
response letter, the moratorium in place at the time of the two supreme 
court decisions had been rescinded on May 12, 2016 to align with state 
law.115 However, an additional, six-month moratorium was required 
because the Boulder County oil and gas regulations at that time were 
outdated and required updating so that they “do not conflict with new state 
laws, to better reflect more recent industry practices, and to best protect 
public health, safety, welfare and the environment in Boulder County.”116 
Because Boulder’s Moratorium was of a “materially shorter duration” than 
that at issue in City of Fort Collins, Boulder County viewed that case as 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Letter from Cynthia Coffman, Colo. Att’y Gen., to Cindy Domenico, Deb Gardner, 
and Elise Jones, Boulder Cty. Comm’rs (Jan. 26, 2017), available at https://coag.gov/sites/ 
default/files/contentuploads/ago/press-releases/2017/01/01-26-17/1-26-17bouldercounty.pdf. 
 110. 2016 CO 28, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016). 
 111. 2016 CO 29, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016).  
 112. See Letter from Cynthia Coffman, supra note 115, at 1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Letter from Ben Pearlman, Boulder Cty. Att’y, to Cynthia H. Coffman, Colo. Att’y 
Gen. (Jan. 27, 2017), available at https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/04/coag-bocc-response-oilgas-20170127.pdf.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Press Release, Boulder County Commissioners, Boulder County Responds to 
Colorado Attorney General on Oil & Gas Moratorium (Jan. 27, 2017), available at 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/COBOULDER/bulletins/1836a25 (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2017).  
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inapplicable.117 As such, Boulder County announced its intent to keep the 
Moratorium in place.118 
As promised, on February 14, 2017, Coffman sued on behalf of the 
People and the State of Colorado (“State”) against Boulder County and the 
Board of County Commissions of Boulder County (collectively, 
“Defendants”).119 The State’s complaint requested both declaratory and 
injunctive relief, asking the court to declare the Moratorium preempted by 
the Act and to enjoin the enforcement or re-creation of the Moratorium in 
any form.120 The Colorado Oil and Gas Association and American 
Petroleum Institute (“Plaintiffs”) successfully moved to intervene as 
Plaintiff-Intervenors in the case.121 Despite the ongoing litigation, Boulder 
County announced on February 27, 2017 that it planned to move forward 
with public hearing on new draft oil and gas regulations as originally 
planned. The Moratorium was set to expire on May 1, 2017.122 
Boulder moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds. First, 
Defendants argued the Moratorium was set to expire on May 2, 2017, at 
which point the State’s challenge to the Moratorium to be moot.123 Further, 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Complaint, People of State of Colorado, supra note 114,  at 2-3. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 12 (“[T]he State respectfully requests that the Court[:] 1. Declare that the 
County’s Moratorium on oil and gas development is preempted by the [Act] and its 
implementing regulations; (2) Permanently enjoin the enforcement of the Moratorium or the 
creation of any similar moratorium or restriction on new oil or gas development in Boulder 
County; [and] (3) Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants on all 
claims[.]”). 
 121. See Colorado Oil and Gas Association’s and American Petroleum Institute’s Joint 
Unopposed Motion to Intervene, People of the State of Colorado ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman 
& the State of Colorado & Colorado Oil and Gas Association & American Petroleuym 
Institute v. County of Boulder, Colorado & the Board of County Commissioners of Boulder 
County, No. 2017CV30151 (filed Feb. 24, 2017), available at https://assets.bouldercounty. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/coga-api-joint-motion-and-complaint-20170224.pdf.  
 122. Press Release, Boulder County Commissioner’s Office, Boulder County Responds 
to Oil & Gas Industry’s Intervention on Lawsuit Filed by the Colorado Attorney General 
(Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd/COBOULDER-
18a0f08 (last visited Sept. 25, 2017). 
 123. See Motion to Dismiss State of Colorado’s Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 11,  Motion to Dismiss, People of the State of Colorado ex rel. Cynthia 
H. Coffman & the State of Colorado & Colorado Oil and Gas Association & American 
Petroleuym Institute v. County of Boulder, Colorado & the Board of County Commissioners 
of Boulder County, No. 2017CV30151 (filed Mar. 7, 2017), available at https://assets. 
bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/motion-to-dismiss-state-of-colorado-compl 
aint-20170307.pdf. 
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challenges to previous moratoriums, which the State, in Boulder’s 
argument, improperly viewed as one continuous moratorium, were already 
moot as these moratoriums had already expired.124 Second, the State’s 
challenge to the Moratorium was barred by the doctrine of laches and the 
statute of limitations, as it came five (5) years after the original moratorium 
was enacted.125  
Plaintiffs both disputed the Motion to Dismiss and filed their Motion for 
Summary Judgment on March 20, 2017, claiming they were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law against Defendants on two grounds.126 “First, 
oil and gas development, including the application and approval process, is 
an issue of mixed state and local concern such that state law preempts any 
conflicting local regulations. Second, the Moratorium operationally 
conflicts with state law because, on its face, it forbids what state law 
authorizes, thereby materially impeding or destroying state interests.”127 
On April 26, 2017, the district court issued a ruling denying Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.128 The district court first opined the State had presented 
a live controversy, as the May 1, 2017 Moratorium expiration had yet to 
occur, thus making it unlawful for the district court to dismiss the action on 
grounds of mootness.129 The district court also held the doctrine of laches 
and the statute of limitations did not bar the State’s claims.130 Most 
importantly, however, was the district court’s discussion on Boulder’s 
characterization of the Moratorium as “of a shorter duration” than that 
struck in the City of Fort Collins.131 The district court found the 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Id. 11-12. 
 125. Id. at 16-21. 
 126. See Colorado Oil and Gas Association’s and American Petroleum Institute’s Joint 
Motion for Summary Judgment, People of the State of Colorado ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman 
& the State of Colorado & Colorado Oil and Gas Association & American Petroleuym 
Institute v. County of Boulder, Colorado & the Board of County Commissioners of Boulder 
County, No. 2017CV30151 (filed Mar. 20, 2017), available at https://assets.boulder 
county.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/coga-api-joint-motion-for-summary-judgment-with-
exhibits-20170320.pdf.  
 127. Id. 
 128. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, People of the State of Colorado 
ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman & the State of Colorado & Colorado Oil and Gas Association & 
American Petroleuym Institute v. County of Boulder, Colorado & the Board of County 
Commissioners of Boulder County, No. 2017CV30151 (filed Apr. 26, 2017), available at 
https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017cv301510-order-denying-
defendants-motion-to-dismiss-20170426.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 4. 
 130. Id. at 3-5. 
 131. Id. at 5. 
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Moratorium did not comply with City of Fort Collins, as “the reality is that 
Boulder County has barred [oil and gas development] applications since 
2012” with its continuous moratoriums.132 Despite Boulder’s position to the 
contrary, “[a] moratorium of six months, followed by an identical 
moratorium of six months, results in a moratorium of twelve months[.]”133 
As the district court was unable to draw any legal distinction between “one 
continuous ban” or “two separate bans”, the action was not moot and 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied.134 
Boulder County thereafter allowed the Moratorium to expire on May 1, 
declaring it had no intent to enact a new Moratorium. Defendants once 
again moved to dismiss on May 2, 2017, contending the case was moot and 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.135 The motion was 
unopposed by Plaintiffs and granted the same day it was filed.136 While this 
case did not reach a decision on the merits, it nonetheless reaffirmed and 
applied Colorado’s firm stance against local government moratoria banning 
oil and gas development at the local level, as had already been establish by 
the Supreme Court in Fort Collins and Longmont. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (“The Oil and Gas Act does not create exceptions to its application on the basis 
of a county’s efforts to ensure that any development occurs safely and in consideration of the 
safety of citizens. In evaluating the preemption by state law of county ordinances, the law 
does not permit the Court to give weight to the County Commissioners’ efforts. The recourse 
of those citizens who have participated in Boulder County’s public process may not best be 
considered the County Commissioners; as the Oil and Gas Act is a state law, state 
representatives may be better positioned to address the concerns of county residents. Neither 
is there an exception in the Oil and Gas Act for a temporary moratorium, regardless of its 
duration.”). 
 135. See Unopposed Motion to Dismiss State of Colorado’s Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief and COGA/API’s Joint Complaint, People of the State of Colorado ex 
rel. Cynthia H. Coffman & the State of Colorado & Colorado Oil and Gas Association & 
American Petroleuym Institute v. County of Boulder, Colorado & the Board of County 
Commissioners of Boulder County, No. 2017CV30151 (filed May 2, 2017), available at 
https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017cv30151-unopposed-
motion-to-dismiss-20170502.pdf. 
 136. See Order Granting Defendants’ Unopposed Motion to Dismiss State of Colorado’s 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and COGA/API’s Joint Complaint, No. 
2017CV30151 (filed May 2, 2017), available at https://assets.bouldercounty.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017cv30151-order-granting-defendants-unopposed-motion-to-
dismiss-20170502.pdf. 
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E. Noteworthy District Court Cases 
Two additional cases which also affect the oil and gas industry are 
discussed briefly herein. First, in Wage Gagnon, et al. v. Merit Energy 
Company, LLC,137 Plaintiffs asked the district court to reconsider two 
determinations from the district court’s previous Order Denying Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification.138 The Plaintiffs asked the district court to 
reconsider, among other issues, its determination that “if a royalty clause 
provides for payment of ‘net proceeds’ it is no longer subject to the Implied 
Covenant of Marketability (“ICM”) under Colorado Law.139 While the 
court ultimately held no basis had been provided to vacate its previous 
denial for class certification,140 the district court did offer commentary on 
the second issue mentioned above. As stated above, the district court, in its 
original order, predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court would rule a 
royalty clause providing for payments on a “net proceeds” basis would 
negate application of the ICM.141  The district court based this prediction on 
Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., in which the Colorado Supreme Court held 
that the ICM applies when leases are silent with respect to the allocation of 
production costs.142 Because the Supreme Court, in Rogers, discusses how 
the “net-back” method of cost allocation allowed for production cost 
deductions, the district court predicted the Colorado Supreme Court would 
find the term “net proceeds” is not silent as to the allocation of costs.143 
Second, in A-W Land Co., LLC, et al. v. Anadarko E&P Company, LP,144 
the district court reanalyzed a previous district court order as it pertained to 
the plaintiffs, representing a class of owners of surface lands that traced 
their ownership of surface lands to deeds issued by Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. These deeds reserved the mineral estates beneath those lands to 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 2016 WL 7868816, No. 14-cv-0832-WJM-KLM (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2016). 
 138. Id. at *1. The district court pointed out that Plaintiffs were not seeking 
reconsideration on the merits of the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for class 
certification. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at *2 (“[T]he [Plaintiffs] have presented no basis for the [district court] to vacate 
its prior denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, and that Order remains in full 
force and effect.”).  
 141. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d 
1086, 1093 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that when no case law is on point, “[the district court’s] 
task in diversity cases is to predict how the state supreme court would rule.”). 
 142. 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
 143. See id. 
 144. No. 09-cv-02209-MSK-MJW, 2017 WL 1023375 (D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2017). 
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Union Pacific, later acquired by Anadarko.145 The district court affirmed its 
previous orders holding the terms “convenient or necessary” and 
“convenient and proper” should be construed from the perspective of the 
owner of the mineral estate only and, accordingly, both refer to the 
convenience of the mineral owner.146 The district court already reaffirmed 
its previous determination that Anadarko could be held liable for trespasses 
where it accepts the fruits of the trespass after obtaining full knowledge of 
the lessee’s tortious action; thus, the matter was a factually intensive one 
that required individual proof in each case.147 Because factual disputes 
regarding what particular items of information of which the Defendants had 
actual, or constructive, knowledge, the district court denied both motions 
for summary judgment.148 
III. Legislation 
During the 2017 legislative session, at least four bills were introduced 
which might have materially affected the oil and gas industry. All four of 
these bills were introduced in the House of Representatives. One of these 
bills had only House sponsors, while the remaining three bills had sponsors 
from both the House and the Senate. Although all four of these bills did not 
pass, a brief summary of each is provided below for informational 
purposes. 
First, House Bill 17-1372 proposed requirements that an oil and gas 
operator give electronic notice, in a format and by a deadline established by 
the Commission, of the location of each flow line, gathering pipeline, and 
transmission pipeline installed, owned, or operated by the operator to the 
director of the commission and each local government within whose 
jurisdiction the subsurface facility is located.149 This bill also would have 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Id. at *1. However, after Anadarko discontinued negotiations for the Surface Use 
Agreement, including royalty negotiations, with the surface estate owners, they brought this 
against Anadarko. Id.  
 146. Id. at *2. Plaintiffs argued that the term “convenient” in the phrase “convenient or 
necessary” in the reservation must be read in harmony with the deeds’ subsequent use of that 
same word in the separate phrase “convenient or proper.” Id. at *3. Thus, Plaintiffs reasoned 
“convenient” must, in both contexts, be viewed from the surface owner’s perspective. Id. 
The district court was unpersuaded as “there is no inconsistency in finding that the first term 
in the phrases ‘convenient or necessary’ and ‘convenient and proper’ both refer to the 
convenience of the mineral owner.” Id. 
 147. See id. at *6.  
 148. Id. 
 149. H.B. 17-1372, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
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required the Commission to post the information on its website in a 
searchable database.150 
Second, House Bill 17-1336 addressed certain requirements associated 
with pooling.151 Specifically, this bill provided that the notice for hearing 
for a pooling application submitted to the Commission must be served and 
published at least 90 days before the hearing.152 It also stated that, before 
entry of a pooling order, the prospective drilling unit operator must give the 
affected interest owners a clearly stated, concise, neutral explanation of the 
laws governing pooling.153 Finally, the bill required operators of drilling 
units, before commencing drilling operations, to file an electronic report 
with the Commission detailing the number of nonconsenting owners and 
the percentage of acres pooled.154 
Third, House Bill 17-256 proposed a clarification of the minimum 
distance from which certain oil and gas facilities must be located from any 
school.155 This bill proposed that the minimum 1,000-foot distance from 
which newly permitted production facilities and wells must be located from 
any school, as required by the Commission, should be measured from the 
school property line and not from the school building.156 The bill aimed to 
further clarify that it does not apply if a school commences operations near 
production facilities or wells that are already actively in use or permitted.  
Additionally, with respect to property owned by a school district, the 
distance requirement applies to the school building, other facilities used for 
school activities, and real property on which a future permanent or 
temporary school building is planned within five years after a production 
facility application is filed.157 
Last, House Bill 17-1124 related to local government interference with 
oil and gas operations and damages associated therewith.158 The bill would 
have required a local government that banned hydraulic fracturing of an oil 
and gas well to be liable to the mineral interest owner for the value of the 
mineral interest.159 Further, it proposed that a local government that enacts 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. H.B. 17-1336, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. H.B. 17-256, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. H.B. 17-1124, 71st Gen. Assemb., 1st  Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
 159. Id. 
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a moratorium on oil and gas activities would have to compensate oil and 
gas operators, mineral lessees, and royalty owners for all costs, damages, 
and losses of fair market value associated with the moratorium.160 
IV. State Regulation 
A. Commission Issues Notice to Operators to Inspect Flowlines 
On May 2, 2017, the Commission called for a statewide review of 
existing oil and gas flowlines following a home explosion in Firestone that 
killed two and critically injured one other.161  Specifically, the Notice to 
Operators (“NTO”) required a two-step review.  In Phase I, all operators 
were required to inspect their existing flowlines within 30 days (i.e. by May 
30, 2017); Phase I also called for operators to report certain information to 
the Commission so that they could create a flowline inventory.162  Phase II 
required operators, within 60 days (i.e. by June 30, 2016), to pressure test 
active flowlines within 1,000 feet of occupied buildings and ensure their 
integrity; additionally, in Phase II, operators were to undertake proper 
abandonment procedures for inactive flowlines, as needed.163 
B. Governor Announces New Policy Initiatives 
Following a series of ongoing meetings with the Commission and other 
stakeholders after the NTO was issued, Governor Hickenlooper announced 
several new policy initiatives on August 22, 2017.164 The policy initiatives, 
to be addressed through legislation or rulemaking over the next 12 months, 
fall into the following areas: 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, Notice to Operators Statewide 
Flowlines or Pipelines – 1100 Series Rules, (May 2, 1017), available at http://cogcc. 
state.co.us/documents/home/announcements/Flowline_Notice_to_Operators_20170502.pdf;  
see also, Press Release, John Hickenlooper, State of Colo. Governor (May 2, 2017), 
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! Strengthening COGCC’s flowline regulations 
! Enhancing the 8-1-1 “one-call” program 
! Creating a nonprofit orphan well fund to plug and abandon 
orphan wells and provide refunds for in-home methane monitors 
! Prohibiting future domestic gas taps 
! Creating a technical workgroup to improve safety training 
! Requesting peer-review of some COGCC rules 
! Exploring an ambient methane leak detection pilot program165 
In addition to these initiatives, the Governor announced the intention of 
the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment to establish an 
alliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Colorado Oil 
and Gas Association.166 The alliance will aim to “collaboratively address 
safety within the Oil and Gas Industry by developing best practices to 
ensure the safety and health of its workforce.”167 It will be important to 
monitor the aforementioned policy initiatives, their implementation, and the 
alliance over the next year.168 
V. Ballot Initiatives 
In the early 2000s, local governments in Colorado began to take greater 
interest in developing their own local regulations addressing oil and gas 
operations.  Currently, in 2017, various local governments, including but 
not limited to Boulder County, Thornton County, Erie County, and 
Broomfield County, have or are considering enacting or amending 
regulations of this type.  Some of the proposed regulations contradict or 
exceed regulations imposed by the Commission.  The status and legality of 
these new efforts is uncertain and not worthy of summary.  Another manner 
in which local governments have attempted to assert additional control is 
through ballot initiatives, which are briefly discussed below. 
Section 1(1) of Article 5, the Colorado Constitution reserves to the 
people of Colorado “the power to propose laws and amendments to the 
constitution and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the 
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general assembly . . . .” During this past year, one ballot initiative affecting 
the oil and gas industry, discussed below, was eventually denied placement 
on the ballot by the Colorado Title Board, and later affirmed by the 
Colorado Supreme Court.  Before discussing Ballot Initiative #20, however, 
it is important to note there could be a decrease in ballot initiatives affecting 
the industry moving forward, as Amendment 71 substantially increased 
prerequisites to place an initiative on the ballot.   
Approved on November 8, 2016, Amendment 71 made the following 
changes to previous ballot requirements: (1) initiative petitioners must 
spread out signature gathering efforts across all of the state’s thirty-five 
(35) senate districts, making it more difficult to collect enough signatures to 
qualify a constitutional amendment for the ballot, and (2) a 55 percent 
supermajority requirement is required for proposed constitutional 
amendments.169 The multiple-district approach is an effort to ensure that 
ballot initiatives are representative of the entire state’s population, rather 
than only signatures from population-dense areas such as Denver. 
During 2017 and after the passage of Amendment 71, voters submitted 
Ballot Initiative #20, which addressed state severance taxes on oil and 
natural gas. Initiative #20 sought to increase the existing severance tax rates 
on oil and gas by 5%, as well as eliminate a credit against the tax based on 
property taxes paid by producers and interest owners.170 It also would have 
lowered the amount of production that exempts a well from the severance 
text; it further exempted tax revenue and related investment income from 
state and local government spending limits.171 This initiative required the 
tax revenue to be credited to the State Severance Tax Trust Fund, the Local 
Government Severance Tax Fund, and a new Severance Tax Stabilization 
Trust Fund. These funds would have been used in the following manner: (1) 
40% to fund public elementary and secondary schools; (2) 30% to fund 
scholarships for Colorado residents attending state colleges and 
universities; (3) 20% to fund medical care and treatment for people 
suffering negative health impacts; and (4) 10% to fund community drinking 
water and wastewater treatment grants.172 On April 28, 2017, the Title 
Board decided to deny the initiative a ballot title on the grounds the Title 
Board lacked jurisdiction to set titles as changed made after review and 
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comment were not highlighted or otherwise indicated in the amended draft 
contrary to C.R.S. § 1-40-105(4).173 This decision was later confirmed by 
the Colorado Supreme Court.174 
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